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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROD C. SLATER, : 
Petitioner - Appellant, 
v. : Case No. 930443-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Department of Human Services, 
CINDY HAAG, Director, and : 
CHRIS MEGALONKIS, H.E.A.T. 
Supervisor, et al. : Priority No. 15 
Respondents - Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court 
granting Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Appellant's 
case be dismissed with prejudice. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (a) (Supp. 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower court correctly dismissed Appellant's 
action "with prejudice." 
The standard of review with regard to a court's dismissal of 
an action is whether the court abused its discretion. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1993) provides in relevant part: 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review 
of final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that 
the order constituting the final agency action is issued 
or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-
46b-13(3)(b). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1993) provides in relevant part: 
(1) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review 
by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 1, 1992, Appellant Rod C. Slater filed a Petition For 
Judicial Review of Administrative Order with the Third Judicial 
District Court in Salt Lake County. On June 22, 1992, Appellee 
State of Utah filed an Answer to Appellant's Petition. On 
September 14, 1992, a Scheduling Conference was held with the 
parties and Judge James S. Sawaya. 
On May 7, 1993, Judge Tyrone E. Medley issued an Order to Show 
Cause, ordering the parties in this case to appear on May 19, 1993 
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. On May 20, 1993, Appellant Slater filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. On June 7, 1993, Appellant's Motion to Dismiss came 
before Judge Tyrone D. Medley for hearing. On June 9, 1993, the 
court filed its order dismissing Appellant's action with prejudice. 
Appellant Slater filed a Notice of Appeal on July 8, 1993. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Rod C. Slater applied for assistance from the HEAT 
Program in March, 1992. (R. 2-3, 8.) The HEAT Program (Home Energy 
Assistance Target Program) is a program within the Office of Family 
Support, Department of Human Services, which provides financial 
assistance with home heating costs for eligible individuals. Utah 
Administrative Code, R513-601-100 (1993) . Financial assistance 
from this program is available only once per year. Utah 
Administrative Code, R513-605-500 (1993). Appellant Slater's 
application for HEAT assistance was approved. (R. 8.) Appellant 
Slater disputed the HEAT program's determination with regard to the 
amount of assistance (R. 3, 9.) and filed a request for an 
administrative hearing. (R. 3, 11.) 
The administrative hearing was held on April 20, 1992. (R. 4, 
8.) The hearing officer sustained the HEAT program's determination 
as to the amount Slater was eligible for during the 1991-1992 
season. (R. 4, 7, 9.) Slater filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
of Administrative Order with the Third District Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and -15(1) (a) (1993) alleging that the 
hearing officer's decision was erroneous. (R. 2-12.) Addendum A. 
Appellee State of Utah filed an Answer to Slater's Petition on 
June 22, 1992. (R. 18-19.) The parties appeared before Judge 
Sawaya for a scheduling conference on September 14, 1992. (R. 24-
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25.) On May 7, 1993, the court issued an Order to Show Cause for 
failure to prosecute, ordering the parties to appear on May 19, 
1993. (R. 26-27.) Slater appeared at the May 19th hearing and 
stated to the court that he would be filing a Motion to Dismiss. 
(Tr. at 1-2; R. 41-42. ) 1 The State did not appear at the May 19th 
hearing. Slater filed his Motion to Dismiss with the court on May 
20, 1993, and it was set for hearing on June 7, 1993. (R. 28-30.) 
Slater and the State appeared at the June 7th hearing. At 
that hearing, Mr. Slater stated that he was asking the court to 
dismiss his claim (Tr. at 3-4;R. 43-44), and also stated that he 
did not intend to re-file this particular action (Tr. at 4-5 ;R. 44-
45). Based upon Slater's representations to the court, Judge 
Medley stated he would be dismissing Slater's action with 
prejudice. (Tr. at 7;R. 47.) On June 9, 1993, the court filed its 
order dismissing Slater's action with prejudice. (R. 32-33.) 
Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court correctly dismissed Appellant's action "with 
prejudice" based upon Appellant's expressed intent to voluntarily 
dismiss the action and Appellant's representation that he did not 
intend to refile the action in the future. 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
1
 Cited pages of the transcript are included as Addendum B. 
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Appellant's action "with prejudice" because Appellant would be 
precluded from refiling his action in the future in any event due 
to the statutory time limit on district court reviews of agency 
actions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
APPELLANT'S ACTION WITH PREJUDICE 
Appellant Slater argues in this appeal that the lower court 
abused its discretion in dismissing his action with prejudice.2 
Slater argues that his action should have been dismissed without 
prejudice under the particular circumstances of this case. 
The lower court's dismissal with prejudice was clearly 
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Slater 
voluntarily filed a Motion to Dismiss his action. (R. 28-29.) 
When questioned repeatedly by the court at the June 7th hearing, 
Slater stated that he wanted his action dismissed (Tr. at 4;R. 44) 
and that he did not intend to refile it at a later time (Tr. at 4, 
5;R. 44-45). Slater repeatedly stated that he might need to file 
a similar action in the future, but agreed that it would be based 
2
 A dismissal with prejudice is tantamount to a judgment on 
the merits and prevents future consideration of the claims. Cobabe 
v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989); Intermountain Physical 
Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
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on a future event. (Tr. at 4-5;R. 44-45.) Based upon Slater's 
representations, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing his action with prejudice. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IN LIGHT OF THE STATUTORY 
TIME LIMIT PROHIBITING APPELLANT'S 
ACTION IN THE FUTURE 
The essence of Appellant Slater's argument appears to be that 
the lower court's dismissal "with prejudice" will bar Slater's 
access to the courts. Appellant's Br. at 31-32. Slater's argument 
fails to recognize that, regardless of whether his action is 
dismissed with or without prejudice, this particular action will be 
barred from the courts as a result of the statutory time limit on 
district court reviews of informal agency actions. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1993) provides as follows: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 3 0 days 
after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3) (b) . 
The agency action from which Slater sought review in the 
district court is the fair hearing officer's written decision dated 
April 30, 1992. (R. 7-10.) Slater filed his Petition seeking 
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review of the agency action with the district court3 within the 30 
day time frame provided by the statute. (R. 2-6.) However, Slater 
evidenced his desire to voluntarily dismiss that action by filing 
his Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1993. (R. 28-29.) Pursuant to 
the 30-day time limit for judicial review of agency actions, Slater 
is forever barred from filing this particular action in the future. 
Therefore, whether the district court dismissed Slater's action 
with or without prejudice is inconsequential. Even if the district 
court had dismissed Slater's action without prejudice, Slater would 
still be barred by statute from bringing this action in the future. 
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Slater's 
action with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's order dismissing Appellant's action 
with prejudice. 
DATED this $^— day of ]jJr^MjjtJ\^l^ , 1994 
(%^^.(?. I/JAJJUA.. 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) (1993) provides that the 
district courts have jurisdiction to review all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 
1994, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and exact 
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Rod C. Slater, 169 South 900 East, 
#4, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
/ W <£. <?. I/JAJS^ 
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ADDENDUM 
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ROD C. SLATER, prose 
169 So. 900 East, #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 534-0295 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROD C. SLATER, : 
Petitioner, ' 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Dept. of Human Services, 
Office of Family Support, 
CINDY HAAG, Director, and ; 
CHRIS MEGALONAKIS, H.E.A.T. 
Supervisor, et al. 
Respondents. [ 
. PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 
> CIVIL No. '7j ^ y y *)C yy 
Petitioner in the above-entitled action presents this Petition 
for a judicial review of the Decision and Order by the above-named 
Respondents, by and through the Office of Administrative Hearings, 
dated April 30, 1992, a copy of which is attached hereto and entered 
as Exhibit #1. 
Petitioner seeks redress in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) and also under the provisions set forth in 
Paragraph three (3) of the title page of aforesaid Administrative 
Order. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner applied for assistance in paying his utility bill 
-1-
vj * * 
in March, 1992 through the H.E.A.T. program (Home Energy Assistance 
Target Program—the name and acronym derived therefrom—or the State 
agency established to disburse Federal funds emanating from the 
founding of this legislation. See Public Law 96-223, "Windfall 
Profit Tax", Legislative History, Vol. 3, 96th Congress, Second 
Session, 1980. Also see enacting legislation under P.L. 97-35, 
short title: "Low-Income Home Energy Assistance"—discussed in 
depth under Cong. & Admin. News, Vol. 1, 97th Congress, First 
Session, 1980) . 
This application for assistance was based on a total loss of 
income from mid-January of 1992 to the 2nd of May due to extensive 
medical problems, including coronary open heart surgery which was 
performed on February 25, 1992. The State H.E.A.T. office handling 
said application, located at 1700 South 1574 West, Salt Lake City, 
under the supervision of Ms. CHRIS MEGALONAKIS, one of the Respon-
dents named herein, chose to sharply reduce the amount of assistance 
your Petitioner felt that he was entitled to receive, based not only 
on his medical disability, but also the extended loss of income which 
amounted to a period of time in excess of three (3) months. 
Thus, the decision of the aforesaid local H.E.A.T. office, made 
in early March, was appealed to the Utah Office of Administrative 
Hearings. A copy of the letter dated March 28, 1992, addressed to 
the Dept. of Social Services Hearing Examiner, signed by Petitioner, 
is attached hereto and entered as Exhibit #2. Included with the 
letter requesting a hearing, as stated above, and also included with 
this Petition is a copy of the original "NOTICE OF DECISION", (Form 
E-9), dated 23 Mar 92 will be entered as Exhibit #3. 
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The grounds for a hearing, as stipulated in Petitioner's hand-
written letter of March 28, were based on l.(c) under HEARING RIGHTS, 
which states in pertinent part, "l.You have the right to a hearing 
before an impartial hearing examiner if the local office has taken 
any of the following actions: (C). Reduced, held, or changed the 
form of your assistance." (See Exhibit #3). 
The requested hearing was scheduled for April 20, 1992, sub-
sequently resulting in a decision favoring the opinion of the local 
H.E.A.T. office which was adverse to Petitioner. 
POINTS ON WHICH PETITIONER INTENDS TO RELY 
In support of this Petition, Petitioner alleges: 
1. The Respondents have erroneously interpreted and misapplied 
the law. 
2. The findings and conclusions of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings in affirming the initial decision of the local H.E.A.T. 
office is without support in the evidence submitted during the hear-
ing and is contrary to existing law. 
3. Each and every part of the aforesaid findings of the Respon-
dents, by and through the Office of Administrative Hearings, is 
arbitrary, unreasonable, and not supported by the facts in this 
matter. 
4. All of the above findings and conclusions of law made by the 
Respondents in all the mentioned matters, wherein the Respondents 
failed to make proper findings and conclusions based upon the record, 
is and are prejudicial to Petitioner and constitute substantial error; 
Respondents had no sound nor reasonable basis in the record for their 
specific findings and no justification for arriving at a decision 
adverse to Petitioner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Therefore, your Petitioner requests that this Court assume 
jurisdiction of this proceeding and of the questions determined 
therein pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(1)(a); that it review such 
findings, Conclusions and Order of the Office of Administrative 
Hearings; that it issue its decree setting aside the Order of the 
aforesaid State agency against Petitioner, and that it grant Peti-
tioner such further Order, decree, and relief as the Court considers 
just and proper. 
DATED t h i s /y^~ day of June, 1992. 
'etitioner, pro se 
-4-
i:A 
ROD C. SLATER is the Petitioner in the instant action and has 
fully read the foregoing Petition for Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Order. 
I, ROD C. SLATER, do hereby swear and affirm under penalty 
of perjury that each and every statement contained within this 
Petition is true. 
1 L STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) j X T - ^ 
rtOTA3VPU6L!3 
\ ^ATECfUTV i 
j» * V Ccnr 's r~\ x^u 'es 
uc> 
^ C-o 
o a i , \ ^ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me 
this l^T* day oj )f June, 1992, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
IN AND FOR SAID COUNTY AND STATE 
-5-
) 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Norman G. Angus 
Executive Director 
Stephanie A. Mallory 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
120 North 200 West. Room 428 
P.O. Box 45500 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0500 
(801)538-3900 
F A I R H E A R I N G I N 
I N T E R E S T O F 
Rod C. Slater 4/92 # 150 
T H 
H E A R I N G D E C I S I O N A N D O R D E R 
The above entitled matter having been regularly heard before the 
Fair Hearing Officer of the Office of Administrative Hearingsf of the 
Department of Human Servicesr and proper notice having been given the 
claimant, and all of the facts
 r circumstances f and rights of the claimant 
having been duly considered: 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: That the decision by the Central 
Region Downtown OFS-DHS Office in only approving the claimant for a 
payment of $134.00 was correct. Refer to Volume VIf § 608. 
Review of this Decision and Order may be secured by the claimant by 
filing a written request for review with either the Director of the 
Office of Administrative Hearings or the District Court within 30 days 
of receipt of the Hearing Decision. 
The district office can appeal a Hearing Decision only by filing a 
petition in the District Court within 30 days of its receipt of the 
Hearing- Decision. 
It is further ordered that a copy of this order be served upon the 
claimant by mailing thereof to his/her last known addressr certified 
mailf return receipt requested. 
Dated this 3n tL day o f April 19 32-
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
Nea l Be rnson 
F a i r H e a r i n a O f f i c e r 
EXHIBIT # i _ P a g e one of four 
FAIR HEARING SUMMARY 4/92 #150 
H.E.A.T. 
Region C (M) DHS-OFS 
Hearing Held April 20, 1992, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Neal Bernsonf Hearing Officer 
ISSUE: 
The claimant requested a hearing on March 31, 1992 to appeal a 
decision by the H.E.A.T. Office in only approving the claimant for 
a payment of $134.00. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The claimant applied for the H.E.A.T. program on March 11, 1992. The 
claimant's apartment is Heated by Steam. The claimant was given a 
Form 1062-H, "Shelter/Household Composition," form to be completed 
by his landlord. He returned the form and his landlord declared that 
the apartment is heated by steam, and the claimant pays a surcharge 
of $25.00. The landlord also declared that the rent goes up when the 
cost of utilities increase. Based on these facts the claimant was 
determined to be vulnerable to increased heating costs. The 
claimant's application was approved and a payment made to the 
claimant of $134.00 in accordance with Volume VI, § 608 which 
states as follows: 
608 How To Decide What the Primary Fuel Type Is 
Applicants must first be determined vulnerable under 
Section 218 before applying the following policy. 
1. Use the primary fuel type code that reflects the 
type of fuel for which the house is designed 
unless the household is actually using a less 
expensive fuel type as the primary heat source. 
In that case, use the fuel type code that 
reflects the type of heat the household is 
actually using. 
EXAMPLE: 
If the house normally uses propane but is 
currently heating v/ith a coal stove then use the 
primary fuel type code "C" for coal. 
Most Steam heat households are NOT vulnerable 
because they do not pay a fuel source direct or 
through the rent. The example is the client 
rents an apartment with steam heat. He pays no 
surcharge for the heat. He does not pay for any 
other utility. 
If the household pays their own electricity to 
bring the steam heat into their apartment they 
are vulnerable. In these situations Steam Heat 
is considered "other" fuel type. The heat from 
the radiators is blown into the room by 
EXHIBIT #1—Page two of four 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued) 
electricity. The fuel type code is "C" 
Coal/Wood/Other. 
When a household is responsible to pay the 
primary fuel source that generates the steamf 
such as natural gas, in addition to a secondary 
source, such as electricity, they are eligible 
for payment under the primary fuel source. In 
this example, they would be paid the natural gas 
fuel rate. This is most common with single 
dwelling household. 
3. For UP&L accounts, use code E only when the bill 
is coded rate 5 or rate 150. If bill is coded a 
rate other than 5 or 150 and the client claims 
they are total electric, UPL must verify the 
client is total electric before an E only rate 
can be paid. 
Based on the above procedures, and as the claimant only pays a 
surcharge, and not the entire Gas Bill that heats the steam boiler, 
the claimant is only entitled to the rate for "C" Coal/Wood/Other. 
The claimant feels that he should receive a higher payment. He does 
not feel that the other code is appropriate in considering his 
circumstance. In all the years he has been approved for the H.E.A.T. 
program, he has never got a payment as low as this year. His 
payments have always been around $200.00 or more. He feels that the 
last section of paragraph two above applies to his household. 
Natuarl Gas heats the furnace which produces steam for his apartment. 
He helps pays for the gas through a surchage which is included in his 
rent. He also has an electrical bill, and does in fact use space 
heaters on occassion during the winter months. Based on these facts 
he feels his primary fuel type should be gas. Furthermore, his rent 
has gone up because of the increase in Gas Costs each year to the 
owner of the apartment. 
Based on the facts of this case, the Hearing Office finds that the 
payment to the claimant was correct. He pays for his steam Heat 
indirectly through a surcharge that is included in the rent. The gas 
bill however is paid by the owner of the apartment. The claimant 
could only get the gas rate of $241.00 if he was paying a gas bill 
separately associated to his apartment. 
I, DECISION: 
The decision by the Central Region Downtown OFS-DHS Office in only 
approving the claimant for a payment of $134.00 was correct. Refer 
to Volume VI, 5 608. 
EXHIBIT #i_page three of four 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I have mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Hearing Decision and Order to Rod C. Slaterf 
Claimant; Jan Hansen, Regional Director; Sara Hudgins, Assistant 
District Office Director; Chris Megalonakis, H.E.A.T. Worker, 
District Office Representatives; and Cindy Haag, Office of Family 
Support. 
Dated ^tyf JO//??^ ^^g^^^^f <^C^£ 
SECRETARY 
EXHIBIT #1—Page four of four 
Gb/Zy s/j^tA<^P 
• f 
iJjlMJ. 
i4J Id @Mv*<-(± jfe*^1 ^z^- J) a** 
EXHIBIT #2—Page one of one 
A - DSS - APA FORM E-9 
23MAR92 
H.E.A.T. - HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE TARGET PROGRAM 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
SLATER ROD C CDD 569225381 
169 SOUTH 900 EAST 
#i» 
SLCY UT 84102 
EFFECTIVE 11MAR92 YOUR APPLICATION FOR H E A T ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN 
APPROVED. THE ENTIRE ALLOCATION OF $134.00 WILL BE SENT TO 
UTAH POWER COMPANY , YOUR FUEL SUPPLIER TO HELP YOU WITH YOUR 
UTILITY BILL. THIS IS THE TOTAL AMOUNT YOU ARE ELIGIBLE FOR DURING THE 
1991-92 HEAT PROGRAM. NO OTHER PAYMENT WILL BE SENT FOR THIS HEATING 
SEASON. 
fc*i%fc*rt * * & * * ? : Vc Vert VcftftftfcrtfcAftAAft A Aft*5**fc Vert ^ ^ 
REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES IN UTAH MUST WAIVE THE SECURITY DEPOSIT FOR 
ALL MORATORIUM AND HEAT CUSTOMERS DURING THE MORATORIUM. THEY CANNOT 
APPLY HEAT MONEY TO A SECURITY DEPOSIT CHARGE. HEAT MONEY MUST BE 
APPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE COST OF YOUR ENERGY SERVICE. IF YOU ARE SERVED 
BY A REGULATED UTILITY AND YOU FEEL THEY ARE NOT TREATING YOU FAIRLY, 
CALL THE COMPANY OR THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. 
rt**ftftft*ycftrtrtft*fcycVc*rtrt:/b'j*rt:HcA^ 
IF YOU MOVE, YOU HAVE 30 DAYS TO TELL YOUR DISCONNECTING UTILITY SUPPLIER 
WHAT YOUR NEW ADDRESS IS AND/OR WHO YOUR NEW UTILITY PROVIDER IS. IF YOU 
DO NOT, THEN ANY H E A T CREDIT BALANCE REMAINING ON YOUR DISCONNECTED 
ACCOUNT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE H E A T PROGRAM. 
HEARING RIGHTS 
1. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO A HEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL HEARING EXAMINER IF 
THE LOCAL OFFICE HAS TAKEN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: 
A. FAILED TO ACT UPON YOUR APPLICATION WITHIN k$ DAYS 
B. DENIED YOUR APPLICATION 
C. REDUCED, HELD, OR CHANGED THE FORM OF YOUR ASSISTANCE. 
2. IF YOU WANT A HEARING ABOUT YOUR H E A T CASE, YOU MUST ASK FOR IT 
WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE. 
3. IF YOU WANT A HEARING, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL OFFICE OR THE ADDRESS 
LISTED BELOW: 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
HEARING EXAMINER 
P.O. BOX 1*5500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84H5-O50O 
k. REFER TO THIS LETTER IF YOU ASK FOR A HEARING. 
EXHIBIT #3—Page one of one 
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II. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in appropriate category) 
DOMESTIC 
DA Divorce/Annulment 
SM Separate Maintenance 
PA Paternity 
SA Spouse Abuse 
UR URESA Action 
PROBATE 
ES Estate 
GC Guardian/Conservator 
NC Name Change 
OT Other Probate 
CIVIL 
AA Administrative Agency 
AP Appeal 
X CV Other Civil 
CN Contract 
CS Custody and Support 
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus 
PD Property Damage 
PI Personal Injury 
PR Property Rights (Real) 
ABSTRACTS 
AJ Abstract of Judgment 
TL Tax Lien 
ADOPTIONS 
AD Adoption 
III. JURY DEMAND: 
. . ( ) YES ( ) NO 
MISCELLANEOUS 
MI Miscellaneous 
MENTAL HEALTH 
MH Mental Health 
WEDNESDAY. MAY 19. 1993 9;QQ A.M, 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The next matter on the calendar is 
the matter of Rod C. Slater vs. State of Utah, case No. 
92090 3097. Counsel? 
MR. SLATER: I am Rod Slater, plaintiff pro se. 
Your Honor, and I am here in response to the Court's 
Order that I show cause why I didn't pursue this matter 
since I filed the action some time ago. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SLATER: I would like to explain, I have 
been pondering for several weeks whether to submit a 
Motion for Summary Judgment or rather than do that to 
submit a Motion to Dismiss. I know from personal 
experience it is very difficult to win those cases when 
you are filing pro se. 
So if it is agreeable to Ms. Verdoia, who is 
the Assistant AG in this matter representing the state, I 
received her order just a few days ago and I had to work 
over the weekend. I wasn't able to prepare a Motion to 
Dismiss before today, but I have it prepared now to 
dismiss without prejudice. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is what I am going 
to require of you, sir. I will require you to file the 
Motion to Dismiss giving proper and timely notice to the 
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State of Utah consistent with the Rules of Procedure, and 
I will rule on that motion at that time. I don't have 
the case file in front of me at this point. So I am 
somewhat handicapped. I just know that time is passed 
and no action has been taken on this case and so I want 
you to file your motion with the proper notification to 
the state in this case. 
MR. SLATER: Okay, sir. I needed a little 
assistance. I didn't know whether I could file it now 
with the Clerk's Office this morning and I was certain it 
wouldn't reach the Court in time for this hearing, so are 
you saying now I have — 
THE COURT: I will give you ten days from today 
to get that taken care of. 
* # # # # 
MONDAY. JUNE 7. 1993 9;QQ A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Let's go to the No. 2 matter on the 
calendar, Slater vs. State of Utah, case No. 920903097. 
VOICE: Carol Verdoia on behalf of the state. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater? 
MR. SLATER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is your Motion to 
Dismiss, sir? 
MR. SLATER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to 
add other than what is stated in the written pleadings 
that I have had a chance to read? 
MR. SLATER: No, I think it is sufficient in my 
Motion to Dismiss, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Verdoia. 
MS. VERDOIA: I guess the only thing I would 
ask in a situation like this, do you normally dismiss 
without prejudice or — 
THE COURT: In this particular situation, I 
would be dismissing the matter with prejudice. 
MS. VERDOIA: That is what I would have 
requested. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater. 
MR. SLATER: Well, Your Honor, I request that 
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it be dismissed without prejudice because I feel I was 
very sincere in filing this action and justified in 
filing this action, rather than just let the Court 
dismiss it as so many were here on the 19th — 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Mr. 
Slater. I think this gets to the heart of the issue. 
This is your lawsuit and you are asking the Court to 
dismiss it, correct? 
MR. SLATER: That is correct. 
THE COURT: And what I am understanding from 
your request to have it dismissed at this time, Mr. 
Slater, is simply that you don't intend to re-file this 
case, do you? 
MR. SLATER: I don't intend to re-file this 
action, this particular action now, but it could be 
possibly a similar action some time in the future. As I 
mentioned in the motion, it is because of my income and I 
don't seek any further assistance from the state at this 
time. And I'd just like to say, Your Honor, that — 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is the point I am 
trying to get at and this is really not that complicated. 
You are asking the Court to dismiss this claim today, 
correct? 
MR. SLATER: Correct. 
THE COURT: Are you telling me that at some 
future date you think you intend to bring this claim 
again? This exact claim, not something that may happen 
in the future, but this claim? 
MR. SLATER: There is a possibility that the 
same kind of action could be filed later if the state and 
the case workers for the state were to take a similar 
action against me in the future. 
THE COURT: But that would be some future event 
and not this particular date alleged in the claim that is 
filed in this particular case. That would be some future 
event, correct? 
MR. SLATER: That is correct. 
MS. VERDOIA: And Mr. Slater won't be 
prohibited from filing an action based on a future claim. 
THE COURT: That is the point I am getting at. 
The dismissal with prejudice, Mr. Slater, doesn't mean 
that you can't bring some future claim at a future date. 
It doesn't preclude you from access to the court for 
future event s. 
MR. SLATER: The same kind of action is 
judicial review of an administrative order. That is what 
the original petition was. 
THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Slater, but the 
dismissal with prejudice does not operate as a bar for 
you to bring some future event, sir. 
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MR. SLATER: I would like to add, Your Honor, 
that I felt that since so many of these are dismissed out 
of hand, that the Court may feel, as I saw in your Order 
to Show Cause hearings on the 19th, that there are so 
many of them dismissed that it would appear that some of 
these suits may be filed frivolously. I don't consider 
this a frivolous suit and I don't want the Court to 
consider that and that is why I filed the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, your impressions are 
mistaken. When you appeared at the Order to Show Cause 
calendar, when those cases were dismissed for the 
parties' failure to appear, I passed no judgment 
whatsoever on the merits of the claims of those lawsuits. 
It is just the mere fact that the parties did not 
prosecute the action. 
So this case today, as I indicated, is 
dismissed. It is dismissed with prejudice. That does 
not operate as a bar for you having access to the courts 
for any future event that may or may not take place. 
MR. SLATER: If I may just add one final 
thought to present, Your Honor. When I called your 
office to file a Notice of Motion to get the date, I 
asked about that very thing from your secretary or one of 
the staff members in your office, if those cases that 
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were dismissed on the Show Cause day that I appeared, I 
asked if those were dismissed with or without prejudice 
and I was told that the vast majority of those are 
dismissed without prejudice. So I feel. Your Honor, that 
if I hadn't even appeared, it is quite possible this 
could have been dismissed without prejudice; and then I 
filed the motion to do it sincerely and in the best 
interest. I know there is a little more paperwork 
involved, but — 
THE COURT: Well, the ruling is standing, Mr. 
Slater, because as you indicated, the only opportunity 
that you would have that you are even considering is some 
future event. And as I indicated to you, you are not 
precluded from filing some future action based on a 
future event. You are not precluded. And so for that 
reason, Mr. Slater, I am going to dismiss the matter and 
this particular case will be dismissed with prejudice. 
That doesn't mean that your claim was non-meritorious. 
It simply means that we are putting an end to this 
particular claim that is contained in this particular 
file, not anything in the future. 
MR. SLATER: Okay, thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slater. 
MS. VERDOIA: Would you like me to prepare an 
Order? 
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JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
CAROL L. C. VERDOIA #5049 
Assistant Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
Attorneys for Office of 
Family Support 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROD C. SLATER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT, 
CINDY HAAG, DIRECTOR, and 
CHRIS MEGALONAKIS, H.E.A.T. 
SUPERVISOR, et al., 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 920903097CV 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss came before this Court on June 
7, 1993. Petitioner, Rod C. Slater, pro se, was present. 
Respondents were represented by their counsel, Carol L. C. Verdoia, 
Assistant Attorney General. The Court, having reviewed the file, 
having considered Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and heard the 
argument of the parties on said Motion, and upon being advised in 
the premises, now makes the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is 
granted and the action herein is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this I day of <-~\^TJ^ , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~] day of June, 1993, I caused 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ORDER to the 
following: 
Rod C. Slater 
169 South 900 East, #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Petitioner Pro Se 
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